Abstract. In this paper, we consider interactions of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and how these interactions can affect the overall traffic and resource allocation between ISPs. In particular, we consider a simplified two-level hierarchical model wherein there are a single tier-1 ISP and
Introduction
Current Internet is basically hierarchical in nature: there are many tier-1 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) providing backbone connectivity service. Regional ISPs, which are usually called the tier-2 ISPs, are customers to these tier-1 ISPs and they pay for the connectivity service. There are some smaller ISPs, which are called the tier-3 ISPs, are then connected to tier-2 ISPs for connectivity and/or local access. Often times, ISPs of the same tier (or level) may negotiate with each other so as to provide mutual connectivity. Whenever two peers of the same tier are connected, we say that these two peers have established a private peering relationship. In essence, a private peering relationship allows two peers to transfer traffic for their local customers without going through their providers at the higher tier. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy and various connectivity relationships.
There are two common ways for a local ISP (which we call peer from now on) to gain the Internet access. The first way is to transmit traffic via the connectivity service provided by its providers (or higher tier ISPs). For this form of traffic transmission, cost will be incurred since the local ISP needs to pay for the amount of traffic transmitted via the provider-customer link. The other way to gain the Internet access is to transmit the traffic via the private peering link, and that the traffic is destined to that particular local ISP. Since there are two ways to transmit traffic, a local ISP often needs to decide on the proper traffic routing: the amount of traffic transmission via the provider-customer link and private peering links, so as to minimize its operating cost and at the same time, satisfy some bandwidth or quality-of-service constraints. It is important to note that for two peers that are geographically apart, it may not be economical or even possible to establish a private peering link, therefore, connectivity between these two peers will be provided by the higher tier ISPs. The tier-1 ISP (which we call ISP from now on), needs to set a proper price for each of its customers so as to attract peers to transmit traffic via the provider-customer link. If the price is set too high, peers may opt to transmit via their peering links. On the other hand, if the price is set too low, then the ISP may not be able to maximize its profit. Another important issue that an ISP needs to consider is proper resource provisioning so that no peer can monopolize the connectivity resource. It is obvious that there exists certain level of interaction between peers and this interaction can affect the decision of the ISP. In particular, the level of pricing and resource allocation can affect the routing decisions of peers, and the routing decisions by peers also affect the level of resource allocation set by an ISP.
The contribution of our paper is to provide an understanding of this form of interaction, in particular, how it can affect the routing strategy of individual peers and resource allocation of an ISP. We propose a distributed algorithm wherein peers and ISP can communicate so that a peer can maximize its utility while the ISP can provide fair resource allocation. We also show that the distributed algorithm is stable and can converge to an equilibrium point quickly.
Let us summarize some related work in this topic. There is a rich literature on Internet pricing [6, 8, 4, 5] , but they mainly concern about the pricing strategy of individual customers, i.e., access charging. Our work focuses on the interaction of a tier-1 ISP and its customers, namely, tier-2 ISPs. Authors in [1] present the revenue maximization and scalability of a service provider. It shows that using the suggested pricing scheme, there are sufficient incentives for an ISP to upgrade its network. However, they do not consider the interaction between peers, namely, peers can exchange traffic via private peering links.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present our mathematical model of representing the interaction of the ISP and its peers. We formulate the maximization function for a peer and show how each peer can perform routing so as to maximize its utility. Conditions of maximization are also presented. We also present the resource allocation algorithm of the ISP to achieve customer diversity. In Section 3, we investigate the convergency issue of the distributed algorithm. In Section 4, we investigate the sensitivity of the system behavior on various system parameters. Finally, conclusion is given in Section 5. . Noted that concave function is commonly used to represent elastic traffic [2] , which is the dominant traffic in the current Internet.
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. For convenience, we denote In making the routing decision, each peer not only needs to consider the cost of transmitting the traffic, but also on the quality of service. In other words, each peer needs to take into consideration of the delay or congestion cost on the links. In this work, we assume each link is represented by an M/M/1 model as in [1] , and one can take the average delay on the link as its congestion indicator. 1 Rather than informing all peers about the current transmission demands p W on the ISP link (this is considered as a confidential information by a peer), the ISP will compute and announce its bandwidth allocation to peer
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can be viewed as the long-term average aggregate request from the customers of peer ¢ destining to peer 1 . For example, average of a monthly traffic from a peer. So the traffic demand is considered as a constant within a certain period. Consider the case when peer ¢ can always obtain a sufficient bandwidth capacity to transmit all the aggregate requests, i.e.
, then the peer will transmit all the requests, while maximizing its utility at the same time. With fixed traffic demands
is therefore a constant. Let us now formulate the objective function of a peer, say ¢ . Peer ¢ wants to maximize the following function:
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, the bandwidth in the private peering link is insufficient for the demand and so part of the traffic must go through the ISP link. It makes the minimum value of
. The second constraint again is due to the absence of private peering link to the "outsiders". The third constraint is the ISP link capacity constraint.
It is important to point out that the optimization process is indeed a coupled optimization process. For each peer ¢ , given the bandwidth allocation
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of the ISP link, it performs an optimization and determines its optimal rates w' a nd will send a bid for this bandwidth allocated by the ISP. After collecting the bidding information from all peers, the ISP calculates the bandwidth allocation according to the biddings. Peers will offer their new biddings based on the allocated bandwidth by the ISP. We model this interaction process as a non-cooperative game wherein each peer offers a bid to the ISP so as to minimize its own cost.
For
, this defines a non-cooperative game between these peers [7] . These peers interact with each other and determine their optimal transmission rates periodically and asynchronously. 
Distributed Solution of the Minimization Problem
In the following, we illustrate how a peer, say . The optimization problem of Equation (1) 
This shows that the Hessian matrix of the objective function in Equation (1) is positive definite on the non-negative space bounded by the capacity constraints Due to the discontinuity of the objective function, the necessary conditions given above may not achieve the global minimum. In here we explore the boundary cases when the transmission rates are zero, i.e.,
. Figures 3 and 4 show these cases. . Figure 3 , which implies the private peering link capacity is adequate for the transmission demand; and Figure 3 , which implies the private peering link capacity is inadequate for the transmission demand. In Figure 3 , the minimum point of the curve is at . We then consider the lower bound under two cases: case i) when
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has to go through the ISP link and the congestion cost in the ISP link must be considered. In general, when
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, the congestion cost in the private peering link is subtracted from the cost. This concludes that the minimum point of
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Distributed Resource Allocation by ISP
Let us present the algorithm in which the ISP can determine the appropriate capacity ) to the ISP as its bidding for the ISP capacity. The ISP gathers the biddings from the peers. Then it allocates the resource represented by the following formula:
Convergency of Traffic Rates
With the traffic distribution algorithm by peers and resource allocation by the ISP we described in the previous section, one important issue that we need to address is whether these traffic rates and biddings will converge. In this section, we investigate the convergency of rates and biddings of peers when the number of peers is large. The experiment considers the case when all peers are of similar sizes and thus have similar traffic demands. We show that the traffic rates distributions and biddings of all peers converge rapidly. We have also investigated in the case when some of the peers are of larger and smaller sizes. For more details, please refer to our technical report [3] .
The environment of the experiment is constructed as follows. There is a network of 
Sensitivity to System Parameters
In this section, we investigate in the sensitivity of the equilibrium point as we vary some of the system parameters. The observation is made to the variation of the transmission rates and the biddings from peers. We have three experiments, each corresponds to only one variation in the system parameters. ) : In here, we show how the change in the traffic demand affects the biddings of all peers. The parameters are constructed as described above. We increase all the traffic demands of peer §6 from §6 to
6
, and investigate the effects in the biddings of peers. Figure 7 illustrates the biddings in the ISP link bandwidth of peers ¦ and §6
. When peer §6
increases the traffic demands, it has to increase the transmission rates both in the private links and the ISP link. So peer §6
gives a larger bid to ISP asking for more bandwidth. This increases the congestion cost in the ISP link. Other peers (eg. peer ¦ ) detect this increase and shift their traffics from the ISP link to their private links, and give smaller bids. throughout the experiment. We see that a peer increases the transmission rate in the ISP link with decreasing price in ISP link. The increases in both the biddings and transmission rates in ISP link are due to the decrease in payment to the ISP link. As a result, peers shift some of their traffics from the private link to the ISP link.
We have two extra experiments in the sensitivity test of (i) private link capacity (2 ' 3 )
) and (ii) ISP link capacity (¡ ). For more details, please refer to our technical report [3] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the interplay between a tier-1 ISP and tier-2 ISPs (peers). A peer has a connection to the ISP, and possibly connected to other peers with some private links. Each peer needs to determine the appropriate amount of traffic via the ISP's link and the private links so as to minimize its cost. The ISP, on the other hand, needs to perform proper resource allocation to distribute its resource properly. We show the necessary and boundary conditions for the transmission rate vectors of a peer to obtain the minimum cost. We present an algorithm for the ISP to do the resource allocation. We then show the optimal rates and biddings of peers converge with the resource allocation algorithm of ISP even when the number of peers is large. Finally, we show and explain how the change in a single parameter can affect the optimal rates and biddings of all peers and that peers can adapt to these changes and quickly converge to an equilibrium solution. The complicated issues of multiple ISPs and multihoming will appear in our future work.
